To quote this paper: M.DIETSH, “The French Competition Authority Fines 12 Manufacturers and Distributors €611 Million for Vertical Price-Fixing in the Household Appliances Sector”, Competition Forum, 2025, n° 0075 https://competition-forum.com.

Between 2007 and 2014, the French household-appliance sector was characterized by a significant expansion of both traditional distributors and emerging online retailers. During this period, ten major manufacturers (including BSH, Electrolux, SEB, Candy Hoover and De’Longhi) and two leading distributors (Boulanger and Darty) gradually developed pricing practices aimed at stabilizing resale prices throughout the market. These practices relied on structured reporting systems, price-monitoring tools[1] and repeated interventions whenever downward price deviations occurred, contributing to a general alignment of resale prices.  

Following investigative measures conducted by the Directorate-General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF), and after several leniency applications and settlements, the Minister of the Economy referred part of the case to the French Competition Authority (FCA) under article L462-5 of the Commercial Code. This referral followed an earlier horizontal cartel case in the same sector, sanctioned by the decision of 5^th December 2018[2], with a fine of €189 million, illustrating the systemic nature of anticompetitive practices in the household-appliance sector. While most undertakings opted for a settlement procedure, two of them contested the grievances, requiring a full substantive assessment.

In its decision of 19^th December 2024, the FCA found that twelve vertical price-fixing agreements had been implemented over seven years. The Authority considered these agreements constituted resale price maintenance practices which fall within the scope of article 101 §1 TFEU and L420-1 of the French Commercial Code[3].  The practices were qualified as restrictions by object in accordance with established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the consistent decisional practice of the FCA. Suppliers and distributors had jointly contributed to maintaining resale prices at artificially high levels, limiting retailers’ commercial autonomy and significantly reducing intra-brand competition. The Authority also noted that these practices marginalized (and in some cases disappearance) pure online players. On this basis, the FCA imposed a record fine (€611million), making it the highest ever for vertical practices in France.

Therefore, this decision provides important clarifications: the Authority consolidates and strengthens its analytical framework regarding resale price maintenance (I); it reaffirms the deterrent function of sanctions in hybrid distribution markets where online competitive pressure is essential (II); and it opens broader reflections on the future calibration of sanctions in increasingly digitalized distribution systems (III).

I. The procedural architecture shaping the development of the case

A. From DGCCRF signals to the bifurcation of proceedings: the progressive construction of case file

The procedural framework of the case was shaped over years, beginning with the initial signals transmitted by the DGCCRF in 2011 and 2012. These alerts (largely prompted by pure online players who denounced persistent price alignment and constraints on discounting) drew attention to potential restrictions on intra-brand competition.

The FCA subsequently conducted a series of dawn raids on October 17^th, 2013, and May 27^th, 2014, enabling investigators to secure internal reporting tools and structured pricing grids. A leniency application submitted by BSH Électroménager on December 3^rd, 2013, provided decisive insight into the internal functioning of the price-monitoring mechanisms and the vertical coordination scheme. The company received a conditional fine reduction of 25% to. 45%.

A major procedural turning point occurred on August 16^th, 2016, when the FCA decided to bifurcate the case into two separate proceedings. The investigative services the conducted 33 hearings and issued 80 requests for information.

The first proceeding addressed horizontal exchanges of sensitive information between manufacturers and culminated in the December 5^th, 2018, decision imposing €189 million in fines.

The second proceeding constitutes the subject of this decision. It focused exclusively on the vertical price-fixing arrangements between manufacturers and distributors.

Taken together, the sequence of alerts, dawn raids, leniency evidence and bifurcation illustrates perfectly a multi-layered evidentiary construction enabling the Authority to isolate and examine the vertical dimension.

B. A procedure marked by settlement and a targeted non-infringement finding

The subsequent course of the proceedings was significantly shaped by the extensive use of the settlement mechanism[4] provided under article L464-2, III of the French Commercial Code, and governed by the FCA’s Procedural Notice (issued on November 21^st, 2018). Ten of the twelve undertakings settled, following an assessment by the “Rapporteur général”, who retains broad discretion to determine whether the procedure is appropriate or not. This extensive use of settlement allowed the FCA to streamline the proceedings and concentrate its adversarial analysis on the two companies (SEB and Boulanger) that chose to contest the objections. All grievances were ultimately upheld against them.

In parallel, the FCA issued a targeted non-infringement finding regarding alleged horizontal collusion based on exchanges of individualized and recent data on sales volumes. To    assess whether these exchanges amounted to a concerted practice, the Authority applied the EU-level commercial-autonomy criterion[5], according to which information sharing is restrictive only when it can influence the independent commercial behavior of undertakings.

In this highly structured distribution network, the FCA drew a sharp distinction between the vertical resale-price maintenance mechanisms, which were central and pervasive, and the horizontal data exchanges, which didn’t independently alter market dynamics. The FCA adopted an effects-oriented approach, grounded in the economic context of a hybrid distribution system, combining online and offline channels, characterized by strong vertical dependency, RPM and tight oversight exerted by manufacturers.

The FCA concluded that the horizontal information flows did not generate an autonomous collusive risk, as vertical control mechanisms dominated the competitive dynamics. Even individualized, data therefore did not materially alter the strategic environment.

This finding suggests that in highly structured vertical networks, the threshold at which horizontal information exchanges become anticompetitive is higher. It also highlights the need for firms and trade associations to design information-sharing systems whose nature, frequency and granularity do not restrict competitive uncertainty, particularly  in concentrated or vertically interdependent markets.

II. On the infringing practices

A. Resale price maintenance through selective distribution systems and “recommended” practices: the establishment of twelve vertical price-fixing agreements

The FCA found that the manufacturers and distributors implemented structured and persistent system of resale-price coordination. These practices were characterized as restrictions by object in line with article 101 §1 TFEU and L420-1 of the French Commercial Code.

The system operated on several interconnected layers. First, manufacturers communicated target resale prices to their retail partners and expected strict adherence across both online and offline channels. Second, continuous price-monitoring tools enabled manufacturers to track deviations in real time and to react quickly when prices fell below the expected level. Many distributors adhered to this pricing policy by providing regular feedback reports. Third, the FCA documented a reactive enforcement mechanism: whenever a retailer deviated downward, manufacturers swiftly intervened (by requesting alignment or exerting pressure through investment budgets or distribution conditions). This architecture reflects a sophisticated and coercive RPM scheme depending on sustained vertical discipline. Rather than on isolated bilateral contacts.

Finally, the coordination was reinforced by structured reporting exchanged. Retailers frequently transmitted information such as lists of competitors’ prices and detailed updates on discount practices online. Such exchanges, considering the context, the purpose and their systematic use contributed sustaining an anticompetitive practice aimed at keeping resale prices.

Overall, the FCA concluded that such a scheme reduced intra-brand price competition, particularly at the expense of pure online players who couldn’t exert downward price pressure anymore because any attempt to undercut prices triggered corrective interventions from manufacturers.

B. Reduced intra-brand competition and the progressive eviction of pure online players

The infringement lasted seven years, covering a large portion of e-commerce in the household-appliance sector. The coordinated behavior sanctioned in the decision demonstrates that the system operated in a way that targeted price deviations originating from pure online players.

Darty and Boulanger played a central role, because rather than passively applying manufacturer recommendations, they willingly positioned themselves as reference points for acceptable pricing levels and encouraged suppliers to intervene when online prices were considered too low. Boulanger exerted notable pressure, including threats of retaliation, to ensure that corrective actions were taken. Their conduct on the market contributed to maintain artificially high resale prices under the pretext of preserving brand value.

The impact on market structure was considerable: according to the FCA, approximately 95% of online distributors initially active during the period either disappeared or were acquired. This decision shows that vertical price-fixing, when combined with selective distribution and systematic monitoring, can structurally weaken intra-brand competition and stifle innovation.

III. On the sanctions

A. A record fine

The Authority imposed a record €611 million fine on the twelve undertakings involved, marking the most severe sanction ever imposed in France for vertical restraints. This amount significantly exceeds the €189 million imposed in the 2018 decision[6]. Rather than detailing the full arithmetic on the 2011 Fining Guidelines, the FCA nonetheless recalls their core logic: the starting point of the fine is determined by the value of sales concerned, ensuring a proportionate link with the economic importance of the infringement. This amount is then adjusted for the gravity and duration of the infringement, with the seven-year period substantially increasing the amount. Finally, the FCA applies individual modulation: upward or downward adjustments, with reductions granted only for settlement or leniency.

This case illustrates the Authority’s willingness to treat large-scale and long-lasting RPM mechanisms as structurally harmful[7] reflecting the by-object nature of this practice and the seriousness of accompanying online restrictions monitored and enforced through dedicated digital tools.

B. Settlement, leniency and the broader deterrent logic

The reductions granted under settlement and leniency highlight the FCA’s consistent incentive structure encouraging cooperation.

Ten undertakings opted for the settlement procedure under article L462-2, III of the French Commercial Code and obtained reductions reflecting the procedural efficiencies generated by their non-contestation. SEB and Boulanger were excluded from any settlement-related reduction once all grievances were upheld against them after a full adversarial review (as they had chosen to contest the objections). The decision also applies leniency to BSH, which received a substantial reduction considering its contribution to establishing the infringement.

The publicity measures ordered reinforce the decision’s deterrent function. The FCA required the sanctioned companies to publish, at their shared expense, and pro rata to their fines, a summary of the decision in Le Monde and Les Echos, thereby signalling the Authority’s intention to enhance market-wide awareness and compliance incentives.

More broadly, this decision opens important reflections on the calibration of sanctions in increasingly digitalized distribution systems. It suggests that future enforcement may place even greater emphasis on preserving online competitive pressure and preventing vertical strategies whose effects can reshape market structure.

Méline DIETSH

[1] F. Jenny, « Les nouveaux enjeux de la distribution en ligne », Concurrences 2018, n° 3 ; P. Bougette & N. Forlani, « Digitalisation des marchés et stratégies verticales », RLC 2020.

[2] Autorité de la concurrence, 5 décembre 2018, n°18-D-24

[3] D. Bosco, « Les prix imposés dans les réseaux de distribution : la persistance d’une restriction par objet », Concurrences, 2015, n° 1 ; L. Idot, « Restrictions verticales et qualification par objet », RTDeur 2016.

[4] N. Petit, « L’économie des incitations en droit de la concurrence : la clémence et ses dérivations », RTDeur 2017.

[5] CJCE, 4 juin 2009, n° C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV et Vodafone Libertel NV c/ Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit,

[6] Autorité de la concurrence, 5 décembre 2018, n°18-D-24

[7] F. Marty, « L’efficacité dissuasive des sanctions en droit de la concurrence », Concurrences 2021, n° 2