To quote this paper: E. DE CARO, “Sony Sanctioned for Abuse of Dominant Position in the PlayStation 4 Ecosystem”, Competition Forum, 2025, n° 0070 https://competition-forum.com. 

Anticompetitive practices are subject to constant scrutiny by the French Competition Authority, particularly when they originate from dominant players operating within closed markets. In Decision No. 23-D-14, issued on 20 December 2023, the Authority sanctioned several companies within the Sony group for abusing their dominant position in the market for controllers compatible with the PlayStation 4 (PS4) console. The decision followed a 2016 complaint filed by Subsonic, a French manufacturer of video game controllers, which alleged exclusionary practices implemented by Sony. After several proposed commitments were deemed insufficient, the Authority ultimately imposed a fine of €13.5 million.

In this case, the Authority determined that Sony, in a dominant position on the market, had implemented two complementary practices. First, technical updates that led to the automatic disconnection of unlicensed competing controllers; and second, selective and non-transparent access to its “Official Licensed Product” (OLP) program, the only means to avoid the effects of the countermeasures. These combined practices resulted in hindering third-party manufacturers’ market access, damaging their reputation and commercial prospects.

Does control over a closed technological ecosystem allow a dominant operator to exclude competitors through selective access conditions and technical restrictions without committing an abuse of dominant position through exclusionary conduct?

The Authority, after conducting a thorough analysis of the proportionality of the measures adopted by Sony, classifies the conduct as an abuse of dominant position and sanctions four companies within the Sony group.

It will therefore be necessary to examine the market structure and Sony’s dominant position in the PS4 ecosystem (I), followed by an analysis of the exclusionary strategy based on the combination of technical and contractual practices (II). Finally, the abuse can be characterized considering the justifications put forward by Sony and the severity of the infringement (III).

I. The qualification of abuse of dominant position in a closed ecosystem

As part of the analysis of the decision, it is necessary to examine the qualification of an abuse of a dominant position within a closed ecosystem. On the one hand, the closed structure of the Sony ecosystem could reinforce Sony’s position of dominance over its competitors (A). On the other hand, it is necessary to assess whether this dominance, reinforced by this particular structure, indeed results in a dominant position under competition law (B).

A. A situation of domination reinforced by the closed structure of the Sony ecosystem

In its analysis, the Authority has precisely delineated the markets on which the denounced practices may have produced anti-competitive effects. It distinguishes between the market for video game consoles and that for accessories, particularly controllers. Sony’s controller is considered the reference controller for all PlayStation users. However, other products are available on the market, and there are also three types of controllers available from competitors: Sony’s controllers, competitors’ controllers marketed under Sony’s Official Licensed Product (OLP)[1], and third-party controllers that are not licensed at all[2].

The Authority has adopted an approach based on product functionality and substitutability and concludes that there is a specific downstream market for controllers designed for the PS4 console, distinct both from controllers intended for other generations of PlayStation and from those compatible with competing consoles[3]. Each console has its own technical specificity, due to proprietary communication protocols that prevent spontaneous interoperability between accessories. As a result, consumers turn to controllers specifically designed for their console, which justifies segmenting the market according to product generation and brand. In addition, regarding the geographic market, the Autorité has defined a national market based on the structure of its distribution network, and the conditions and role of Sony’s French group companies.

Thus, Sony is in a dominant position on the national upstream market for the supply of PS4[4] controllers, due to its market share, which was well in excess of 76%, and which thus “constitutes a very strong indication of a dominant position”[5], but also due to the barriers to entry and the fact that Sony is the only company to fully control the parameters of the Sony ecosystem[6]. This gives Sony a special responsibility on the market, as abuse of a dominant position is punishable under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union[7] and Article L. 420-2 of the French Commercial Code[8].

B. The existence of a dominant position on the part of the Sony group

The Authority was therefore able to easily establish the dominant position of the Sony group, in particular due to the DualShock 4[9] controller produced and marketed by Sony, which is delivered with each console. Indeed, the DualShock 4 controller is described as having “perfect, long-lasting compatibility with the PS4 console”, and the Authority insists on its ‘reliability’ and “quality”, making the model almost indispensable for proper use of a PS4.  This gives Sony an undisputed benchmark position with consumers. Even more so as controllers marketed by Sony’s competitors must be able to comply with the standards imposed, even though they do not have the technical means to guarantee the compatibility of their products.

The group’s market share in the supply of PS4 controllers is described as “overwhelming”, due to the central role of the product and the closed ecosystem in which it takes part. The Autorité also insists on the existence of very high barriers to entry, due to Sony’s reputation, its mastery of the PS4’s proprietary technology, the asymmetry of information vis-à-vis third-party manufacturers and the opacity surrounding access to the licensing program.

The issue lies in the fact that Sony exercises exclusive and unilateral control over the PlayStation ecosystem, particularly through the “Official Licensed Product” (OLP) licensing program, which is a necessary condition for marketing fully compatible accessories with the console. This creates particularly high barriers to entry on several levels. First, access to the OLP program is entirely dependent on Sony, which has sole discretion in selecting partners, without any transparent eligibility criteria or appeal process. As noted by the French Competition Authority (points 250–253), the limited number of accepted licensees compared to the volume of submitted applications reveals a very restrictive admission policy.

Second, these barriers are reinforced by technological dependence on the PlayStation system: Sony controls the essential elements for accessory compatibility, including features such as vibration and user light identification, which are protected by patents. Third-party manufacturers wishing to avoid infringing Sony’s intellectual property rights often have no choice but to forgo integrating these features, at the expense of product quality[10].

Thus, even when competitors make efforts to comply with intellectual property rules, they are structurally disadvantaged—not because of consumer preference, but due to the closed nature of Sony’s ecosystem. As a result, Sony has not strengthened its position through competition on the merits, but through ecosystem foreclosure strategies. This control over both the legal and technical conditions of market access effectively blocks the emergence of meaningful competition and significantly restricts competition in the market for PlayStation-compatible accessories.

II. Eviction abuse based on combined technical and contractual practices

It is now necessary to examine the implementation of an exclusionary abuse, based on a combination of technical and contractual practices by the Sony group. This highlights two strategies that, when combined, significantly impact market competition. First, the use of software updates as exclusionary tools allows Sony to impose a technological lockout aimed at excluding its competitors (A). Then, the discriminatory and non-transparent access to the OLP licensing program constitutes another lever that may affect competition and reinforce the dominant position of the Sony group (B).

A. Using software updates as exclusion tools

In its analysis, the Authority relies on the exclusion mechanism put in place by Sony, which is based on the technical dimension of its ecosystem. Between 2015 and 2020, Sony rolled out several updates to the console’s operating system, resulting in automatic disconnections of certain unlicensed competing controllers. These updates, presented as standard software maintenance operations, have a discriminatory effect on products manufactured by third parties, competitors who do not have an official license. Even more so as this period corresponds to the time during which the PS4, released in 2013, was marketed before the release of the PS5 in 2020[11].

The controllers in question did not benefit from a unique identification number, reserved only for Sony controllers or those of their partners included in the OLP program so that Sony could identify them. It is this number that enables the connection to the console to be maintained following an update and is therefore essential to the correct operation of the product. Without it, the controllers would be difficult to use, and the impact on the user would be immediate, as would be the reputation of third-party manufacturers. Joining the OLP license is therefore the only way for manufacturers to adapt their products to the Sony ecosystem without encountering technical difficulties.

This forced competitors affected by the problem to try and develop emergency corrective software measures, which were often very difficult for consumers to implement. The brand image of third-party products was also impacted by this disconnection problem, since when third-party controllers could not be used, consumers considered that the problem lay with the brand, which was not selling products of sufficient quality and viability for correct use. They equated the technical problem with the brand which, in their view, sold products that didn’t work. In this way, the Autorité found a practice of targeted exclusion, without any objectively necessary technical basis or transparent information.

B. Discriminatory and non-transparent access to the OLP licensing program

Some of the competitors’ controllers are marketed under an Official Licensed Product (OLP) partnership, which grants a company the opportunity to obtain a license to use the intellectual property rights held by Sony. However, this system has several subtleties, since it offers only discriminatory and non-transparent access to the license. Thanks to an identification number, manufacturers could easily make their products compatible with the Sony ecosystem. In a ruling handed down on January 23, 2014[12], the Court of Justice of the European Union had defined a technical measure as a device for recognizing not only the medium of the work but also the playback device enabling access to the work. But these measures must not go beyond what is necessary.

Joining Sony’s OLP program is more difficult. The investigation showed that Sony systematically rejected requests from certain manufacturers to find out the conditions of membership, without providing any objective criteria or reasons for refusal. On the other hand, other manufacturers were able to join the program without any explanation as to why they had been selected. This lack of transparency constitutes a contractual barrier to entry, making it difficult for unlicensed operators to gain access to the market. There is a differentiated treatment between manufacturers which is not justified in this case.

Finally, one point that the Authority emphasizes is the fact that Sony implemented two practices which, cumulatively, led to a real exclusion of competitors on the market. Firstly, technical countermeasures aimed at systematically disconnecting an unofficial product, followed by an opaque licensing policy under the OLP program that made it impossible to access the license. This situation demonstrates an overall strategy of eviction, since by blocking competing products and locking access to a licensing mechanism, Sony has put in place very strong barriers to market entry which have had a lasting effect on the free play of competition.

III. Abuse characterized by Sony’s lack of valid justification

In this case, Sony tried to legitimize its behavior by invoking the need to combat counterfeiting, but this justification did not convince the Authority, which rejected it as unfounded (A). Furthermore, the seriousness of the infringement led to a particularly heavy penalty, justified by the duration, the scale of the anti-competitive effects and the coordination between several group companies (B).

A. Rejection of the anti-counterfeiting justification

As justification, Sony invoked the protection of its intellectual property rights, notably its patents, trademarks and technical protocols. According to the brand, certain third-party controllers infringed its rights, and the technical measures deployed were intended solely to prevent counterfeiting. Difficulties arose as the Japanese Sony company, Sony JP, struggled to prove its ownership of the patents concerned. The transfer of rights to the three European patents came late, 19 months after the first statement of facts, and almost 18 months after the seizures, even though two of them had fallen into the public domain[13]. In a ruling handed down on September 4, 2020[14], the Paris court declared the infringement actions brought by Sony JP and Sony UK inadmissible and dismissed Sony France’s claim based on the same facts. The Court of Appeal, in a ruling dated September 9, 2022[15], confirmed this decision. It recognized the legality of Sony’s ownership of the patents, but only in respect of acts subsequent to August 13, 2018, when two of the three patents had already expired.

Regarding the argument that Sony’s practices had the sole aim of protecting their rights, it appeared complicated here to justify the practices by efficiency gains that could offset the anti-competitive effects[16]. Article L. 420-4 of the French Commercial Code[17]provides that an anti-competitive practice may be justified if it contributes to economic progress, if it does not eliminate a substantial part of competition or go beyond the restrictions necessary to achieve this objective. In a judgment of February 14, 1978[18], the ECJ defined the concept of a dominant position, but held that it could not be accepted that a company in a dominant position could “hinder the maintenance of effective competition on the relevant market”, even to protect its intellectual property rights.

The Authority rejected this justification, since no evidence had been produced to demonstrate the existence of any acts of counterfeiting in France, or even regarding Subsonic. As far as foreign court rulings are concerned, they are not sufficient since they are neither final nor enforceable under French law. What’s more, the measures applied by Sony are not targeted, they are generalized and automatic, which leads to a manifest disproportionality. The Authority would point out that the protection of intellectual property rights cannot justify an abuse of a dominant position, unless it can be shown that the measures adopted are necessary, proportionate and non-discriminatory. A market-dominant manufacturer wishing to protect its own commercial interests, by defending the ownership of its patents, cannot justify resorting to anti-competitive practices on the merits[19]. In this case, the updates affected all unlicensed controllers, without distinguishing according to their quality or legal conformity, which reinforces a strategy of eviction rather than a legitimate defense to preserve a right.

B. The severity of the penalty considering the seriousness of the infringement, reinforced by its duration, its effects and the coordination of group compagnies

Finally, the Authority also underlines the seriousness of the abuse, particularly in light of its duration, as the practices persisted for over five years and had lasting effects on innovation and competition. It should also be noted that between November 2019 and October 2020, Sony submitted four draft commitments in an attempt to bring the procedure to an end. However, these proposals were ultimately rejected in Decision 20-S-01 of 29 October 2020, as they were deemed insufficient to address the competitive concerns raised by the Authority. This failed attempt to settle the case highlighted not only the complexity of the anti-competitive effects but also cast doubt on Sony’s willingness to effectively bring an end to the practices at issue.

In 2019, Sony proposed a first series of commitments, pursuant to Article L. 464-8 of the French Commercial Code[20], which was the subject of a public consultation with a market test on November 22, 2019. Following a meeting and an examination of a final proposal for commitments, the Authority considered that the commitments proposed by Sony could not be accepted and did not provide a relevant response to the competition concerns identified and referred the case back for further investigation[21].

In its decision of December 20, 2023, the Authority attributed the infringement to four Sony group companies, involved at different levels of the economic chain: the parent company Sony Group Corporation, the Japanese subsidiary Sony Interactive Entertainment Inc. K.K, the European subsidiary Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Limited, and the French subsidiary Sony Interactive Entertainment France. This coordination between the various companies reinforces the coherence and eviction strategy implemented by Sony. The parent company was held liable in its capacity as parent company, the European company in its capacity as author, since it was responsible for the OLP program in Europe, the Japanese company in its capacity as author, since it was in charge of rolling out updates and was at the origin of the OLP program, and finally the French company because it was responsible for marketing Sony controllers in France. The Authority thus imposed a fine of 13.527 million euros, which was divided between the entities involved in the practice. The aim was to dissuade the companies from any repetition of the practice, and to illustrate with this amount a firm determination to punish abuses in closed ecosystems in which dominant companies will try to prevent any effective competition.

Elsa DE CARO

[1] Sony Interactive Entertainment, « Official Licensing Program », [online] : https://sonyinteractive.com/en/contact-us/official-licensing-program/

[2] Autorité de la concurrence, Press release on decision 23-D-14 of December 20, 2023 concerning practices

implemented in the sectors of eighth-generation static video game consoles and control accessories compatible with the PlayStation 4 console, Dec., 20, 2023.

[3] Marie Cartapanis, Barrières à l’entrée : L’Autorité de la concurrence sanctionne une entreprise à une amende de 13,5 millions d’euros pour un abus de position dominante mis en œuvre sur le marché de fourniture de manettes de jeu vidéo pour Playstation 4 (Sony), December 20, 2023, Concurrences N° 1-2024, Art. N° 116983, pp. 88-91.

[4] LEBEN avocats, Sony ordered to pay 13 million euros by the French Competition Authority: Anti-competitive practices in the video game console sector.

[5] Autorité de la concurrence, Decision 23-D-14 of December 20, 2023, pt. 169.

[6] Ibid pt. 172.

[7] Article 102, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

[8] Article L. 420-2, French Commercial Code.

[9] Sony Interactive Entertainment, DualShock 4 Wireless Controller, [online] : https://www.playstation.com/en-us/accessories/dualshock-4-wireless-controller/

[10] Autorité de la concurrence and Competition and Market Authority, Economic analysis of open and closed systems, December 16, 2014.

[11] Alain Ronzano, Barrières à l’entrée : L’Autorité de la concurrence sanctionne une entreprise à hauteur de 13,5 millions d’euros pour abus de position dominante en mettant en oeuvre une pratique d’éviction sur le marché des manettes de jeux vidéo pour Playstation 4 (Sony), 20 décembre 2023, Concurrences N° 1-2024, Art. N° 117602, www.concurrences.com.

[12] Simon Christiaën, “Game over for SONY or how the world’s number one video game manufacturer saw its patent

infringement action protecting its PlayStation before the French courts backfire”, Dom & Associés, Nov. 17, 2022,

updated Dec. 19, 2022, [online] : https://domassocies.com/actualites/contrefacon/game-over-pour-sony/.

[13] Simon Christiaën, “Game over for SONY or how the world’s number one video game manufacturer saw its patent

infringement action protecting its PlayStation before the French courts backfire”, Dom & Associés, Nov. 17, 2022,

updated Dec. 19, 2022, [online] : https://domassocies.com/actualites/contrefacon/game-over-pour-sony/.

[14] Paris Judicial Court, 3rd chamber, 2nd section, judgment of September 4, 2020, no. RG 17/01825

[15] Paris Court of Appeal, Pôle 5, Ch. 2, ruling of September 9, 2022, no. RG 20/12901

[16] Livv.eu, “Efficiency gains”, [online] : https://livv.eu/glossaire/gains-defficacite-notion-de

[17] Article L. 420-4, French Commercial Code

[18] ECJ, No. C-27/76, Judgment of the Court, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission

of the European Communities, February 14, 1978

[19] CJEU, January 30 2020, Generics UK Ltd, C-307/18.

[20] Article L. 464-8, French Commercial Code

[21] Autorité de la concurrence, Press release, PlayStation: the Autorité considers that the commitments proposed by Sony do not adequately address the competition concerns identified. Le dossier est renvoyé à l’instruction, Oct. 26,

2020.