To quote this paper: A. NICLIN, “Platforms, drivers and competition: The French Competition Authority’s view of VTC collective agreements”, Competition Forum, 2025, n° 0069 https://competition-forum.com.

On January 21, 2025, the French Competition Authority issued an opinion (no. 25-A-03) on the agreement of December 19, 2023 reinforcing the freedom of choice of their journeys by VTC drivers using a matchmaking platform, in a context marked by the rise of digital platforms in the transport sector, and by the growing desire of the public authorities to regulate relations between these platforms and the self-employed workers who use them.

This opinion is part of a recent drive to regulate relations between platforms and self-employed workers, initiated by the legislator to frame practices in the VTC sector. Indeed, the legislator has made social dialogue between platforms and self-employed VTC drivers compulsory, through the intermediary of representative professional organizations. This dialogue has led to the conclusion of several agreements, including the one submitted for the Authority’s opinion, aimed at improving drivers’ working conditions, notably through the introduction of minimum incomes per trip or per hour of activity.

The agreement under review provides for each platform to set up a system enabling drivers to define a minimum revenue per kilometer threshold above which they wish to receive priority offers of rides. Although signed by a single professional organization of platforms – whose main member is Uber -and two professional unions, this agreement meets the legal conditions to apply to its signatories by virtue of article L.7343-29 of the French Labor Code[1].

However, its approval by the Authority for Social Relations of Employment Platforms (ARPE), with a view to its extension to all platforms and drivers, presupposes a legality check, particularly about competition law. The question that arises here is to what extent this agreement, although in principle legal and beneficial to VTC drivers, could harm competition on the market for matchmaking platforms? In this respect, the French competition authority has ruled not only on the conformity of the agreement with competition law, but also on the potentially anti-competitive effects of its generalization.

To address these issues, the analysis will first consider the market position of the platforms, as this is essential to assessing competitive risks (I). Next, we’ll look at the specific case of Uber, the only player currently in a position to implement such an agreement, since it is the only player to have the necessary technology, which could lead to anti-competitive foreclosure (II). Finally, the analysis will review the French Competition Authority’s opinion, its recommendations to the EPRA, and the prospects for competition in the sector (III).

First, to understand why this agreement is being analyzed by the French Competition Authority, particularly in terms of its potential effects on competition, we need to understand what type of market the players are in, and what is at stake in this market.

I. Examining the competitive landscape for taxis/VTCs: from market boundaries to the risk of anticompetitive agreements

The French Competition Authority analyzes the competitive risks in the public transport of private individuals (T3P) market in two stages. On the one hand, it defines the relevant market to assess the competition between taxis and VTCs (A). On the other hand, it examines the risk of anti-competitive agreements related to the collective regulation of VTC remuneration (B).

A. Delimiting the relevant market in the VTC and Taxi sector: a comprehensive approach

First, the authority defines the relevant market. In its opinion no. 23-A-18 of November 29, 2023 on the passenger land transport sector (known as the “Mobilités opinion”)[2], it distinguished two types of market: a without reservation market in which taxis have a legal monopoly and a pre-booked transport market in which taxis and VTCs compete.

The Specific Public Passenger Transport Services (T3P) with reservations market covers all cases where a driver has a reservation prior to arriving at the meeting place set by the customer. This market has undergone a major transformation over the last ten years with the emergence and expansion of VTC platforms, intensifying competition between taxis and VTCs. The rise of these platforms has largely blurred the distinction between taxis and VTCs in the eyes of consumers, a trend that can be observed both in France and throughout the European Union. According to a survey carried out by the European Commission[3], users now perceive taxis and VTCs as similar services, mainly considering criteria such as “availability” and “ease of booking” when making their choice. This evolution reflects the intensification of competition, facilitated by digital platforms.

Regarding the delimitation of the relevant market, it is useful to refer to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which defines the relevant market as “all goods or services which are interchangeable or substitutable by consumers”[4]. This definition provides a better understanding of the Competition Authority’s approach, which in this context is based on the perception of consumers, who now see taxis and VTCs as similar services.

In the reservation based T3P market, the relationship between driver and passenger can take place either directly, without an intermediary, or via a digital platform. This latter category constitutes a two-sided market, as it relies on intermediation between two groups of players: drivers and passengers. The two-sided market is used to “emphasize that the demand for a product or service is characterized by two or more distinct customer or user groups – the two ‘sides’ – and where at least one of these groups cares significantly about the involvement of another group”[5]. In the VTC sector, a platform’s ability to grow depends above all on its ability to attract enough taxis or VTC drivers.

The French Competition Authority also distinguishes between the various platforms according to their business model and the services they offer. For example, platforms such as Uber, Heetch and Bolt mainly target private customers in major cities, while others, such as Allocab or Marcel, cater more to business customers for longer journeys with higher fares. This distinction between services provides a better understanding of market segmentation and the competitive strategies of the different platforms.

Finally, it’s important to stress that competition is not only based on platforms ability to attract customers, but also on their ability to segment the market and target specific niches. Platforms aimed at individuals in urban areas are in competition with those geared towards long-distance business trips.  This differentiation of services provides a clearer picture of competitive risks, as it shows that competition goes beyond the simple provision of transport services to encompass strategies for targeting different categories of consumer. This indirect competition stems from the diversification of services, which enables platforms to broaden their customer base and enter neighboring markets.

Indeed, even if market segments are distinct, competition may intensify as barriers between these segments are reduced (notably through diversification strategies or technological innovations), which could affect the competitive balance. Competition law then analyzes not only direct competition, but also potential competition between these platforms in different consumer segments, checking whether their practices distort competition, for example by limiting market access or distorting competition through pricing or innovation strategies.

B. Collective regulation of VTC remuneration: study of the potential risk of anti-competitive agreements

Collective agreements in the VTC sector are based on the provisions of collective bargaining agreements and branch agreements under labor law. They are negotiated and concluded by company organizations, with the aim of organizing and regulating labor relations in the sector.

Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)[6] prohibits agreements, concerted practices, and decisions by associations of undertakings which restrict competition, resulting from agreements of will between autonomous entities. Under French domestic law, Article L420-1 of the French Commercial Code[7] stipulates that concerted actions, agreements, express or tacit understandings or coalitions whose object or effect is to prevent, restrict or distort competition on a market are prohibited. This includes practices which limit market access or the free exercise of competition, hinder the free determination of prices, control production, outlets, or technical progress, or share markets or sources of supply.

However, according to European case law[8], agreements concluded within the framework of collective bargaining between social partners, aimed at achieving social policy objectives, improving working conditions for employees fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU by virtue of their nature and purpose.  Similarly, in a 2011 ruling, the same reasoning was applied to a collective bargaining agreement in the craft bakery sector, which introduced a supplementary health insurance scheme, with the reimbursement of healthcare costs “contributing to the improvement of working conditions”[9].

The September 30, 2022 guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements concerning the working conditions of self-employed workers without employees[10] asserts that “agreements entered into in the framework of collective bargaining between employers and workers and intended, by their nature and purpose, to improve working conditions (including pay), fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU”. It defines solo self-employed person as “a person who does not have an employment contract or who is not in an employment relationship, and who relies primarily on his or her own personal labour for the provision of the services concerned”.

According to the Commission, all forms of collective bargaining are covered, from negotiation through social partners or other associations, to direct negotiation by a group of self-employed workers without employees or their representatives with the company for which they work on aspects such as[11]: pay, rewards, bonuses; working hours and patterns; vacations and leave; the physical space where work takes place; health; safety; insurance and social security.

The question put to the French Competition Authority is whether the collective agreement could encourage a cartel between VTC drivers. In principle, the agreement analyzed falls within the scope of the European Commission’s 2022 guidelines and would therefore not be prohibited under Article 101 TFEU, pending any case law.

Reactions from drivers’ professional organizations vary widely. Some unions fear downward pressure on rates, fearing that drivers will be forced to accept very low prices to remain competitive. Others warn of the possibility of certain drivers manipulating prices by “breaking” or “inflating” rates. The president of the French Federation for Pre-booked Passenger Transport (FFRTPR) even claims that the agreement “will allow cartels between drivers”. Nevertheless, it calls for vigilance in the face of concerted behavior, which could exist independently of this agreement.

Such concerted action between drivers, aimed at setting a common minimum revenue-per-kilometer threshold and collectively refusing trips below that threshold, could be qualified as a cartel under competition law. In this case, the fact that self-employed drivers, who are legally autonomous, agree to a minimum price threshold constitutes a limitation on the free setting of prices, and restricts the platforms’ access to a workforce available for lower-priced journeys. This practice would hinder price competition between drivers and distort the smooth operation of the market by depriving the platforms of the possibility of freely adjusting their offers.

However, the Authority notes that the agreement does not significantly increase the risk of collusive behavior, as drivers are already free to accept or refuse rides based on their own criteria — a freedom which, in practice, may already allow for forms of coordination between drivers to reject certain trips, independently of the agreement. It nevertheless calls on industry players to remain vigilant in the face of possible concerted behavior, which could constitute cartels within the meaning of competition law – while recalling that such practices may already exist independently of the entry into force of the December 19, 2023 agreement. 

While the proposed agreement does not constitute a cartel, it nevertheless raises the question of a potential exclusionary abuse, as Uber is currently the only player with the technological capabilities required for its implementation (II).

II. Analysis of Uber’s position and the risk of technological foreclosure in the sector

In this context, it is necessary to question why this agreement is subject to review by the French Competition Authority, particularly in light of its potential technological foreclosure effects on the market.

Accordingly, it is appropriate to first, assess Uber’s position within the French market across its various sectors of activity, taking into account previous decisions in which its anti-competitive practices have been sanctioned (A) and second, to emphasize the significant technological advantage Uber holds, particularly in terms of algorithms and data management, which could, in the long term, enable it to marginalize or eliminate its competitors, thereby consolidating its market position (B).

A. The gradual consolidation of Uber’s very strong position in the French market and its antitrust background

It is appropriate to assess the potential competition risks that may arise from the decision to extend the agreement to the entire sector.

From the perspective of competition law, the mere fact that a single operator holds a technology that is not accessible to its competitors — whether because they lack it altogether, because acquiring it would entail significant costs, or because one operator has gained a considerable lead in its development even if the technology is not yet fully operational at the time of assessment does not, in itself, does not constitute an infringement of competition rules. The key issue raised by the agreement and its approval lies in the potential risk of hindering or excluding from the market those platforms that may not be able to acquire, quickly and easily, the tool required to comply with the new obligation.

The French Competition Authority analysis raises important questions about the dominance of the major platforms, notably Uber, which benefits not only from a large base of drivers, but also from a considerable volume of data. This power could create barriers to entry for new platforms, limiting competition. Access to many drivers and customers represents a major asset for development, and the big platforms enjoy a competitive advantage due to their size and ability to collect and exploit data on a large scale.

In France, Uber occupies a very strong position, both in the market and in the collective development of the VTC sector. It has the capacity to significantly influence both the competitive situation and the content of the agreements resulting from the dialogue process. As far as the platform federations are concerned, only two can take part in negotiations with the professional organizations of independent VTC drivers, and one of them carries considerable weight, since its main member is Uber.

To better understand the legal challenges faced by Uber in the VTC platform market, the decision of the Paris Court of Appeal on October 4, 2023[12], concerning the UberPop service, offers valuable insight. Contrary to a case of abuse of dominant position, the Court qualified Uber’s conduct as unfair competition. It found that Uber France had deliberately encouraged the development of an illegal transport service—UberPop—by bypassing regulatory requirements applicable to on-demand passenger transport. These illicit practices created an abnormally favorable situation for Uber and its drivers, whether occasional or professional, compared to traditional taxi drivers who complied with the law. This distortion of competition did not stem from Uber’s dominant position per se, but rather from its strategy of disregarding legal norms to accelerate market penetration and attract users.

On a downstream market limited to the main ride-hailing platforms active in France, Uber appears to be the market leader — both in terms of trip volume and the total distance driven by drivers. This suggests a high adoption rate of its platform by consumers and a strong preference for Uber among passengers.

Regarding the number of kilometers traveled, the similar market share (between 50 and 60%[13]) shows that Uber’s trips also cover long distances. This could indicate a larger proportion of long or intercity trips, or an even more efficient management of long-distance journeys, further strengthening its dominant position. However, the Authority stresses that this opinion is not intended to conclude that Uber dominates the market, notably due to the lack of information provided by several platforms, and the absence of a geographical analysis of the relevant market, which prevents a precise delimitation of the different markets. However, it points out that it is important to consider Uber’s special position on the French market for T3P with reservations, thus encouraging greater vigilance in the analysis of competitive risks on this market.

After observing Uber’s dominant position in the market and among users, it is important to note that this position is also reflected in the framework of social dialogue within the VTC sector. Uber indeed plays a central role, with the ability to significantly influence both the competitive environment and the content of collective agreements. In this process, only two platform federations take part in negotiations with independent driver organizations, and the considerable weight of the API in these discussions is primarily due to its main member, Uber.

The big platforms, such as Uber, enjoy market dominance due to their large user base and volume of data, which enables them to constantly improve their services (B).

B. Uber’s strategic technological advantage as a lever for market foreclosure and competitive exclusion?

The question raised is whether the possession of a specific technology by a market player can be qualified as a technological foreclosure practice within the meaning of competition law.

In the present case, for the French Competition Authority, the main issue at stake in the agreement and its approval lies in the possibility that such a decision might hinder market access for certain platforms, which might not have the capacity to easily and rapidly acquire the technology required to comply with the new obligation. The French competition authority would like to point out that “in itself, the possession by a single market operator of a technology which is not available to its competitors, or the acquisition of which represents a significant cost, or on which an operator has taken a considerable lead in design and development even if the technology is not yet fully operational at the time of the analysis, does not constitute on the contrary an infringement of competition law rules”.

This risk becomes particularly serious when it comes to imposing a technology that only one major player, such as Uber, possesses. In certain cases, making the use of this technology compulsory for all operators exposes the State, as the creator of the obligation, to the risk of automatic abuse of a dominant position.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has clarified, for example in the context of the joint application of Articles 102 and 106 TFEU[14], that it is not necessary to prove that a dominant company has committed or could commit a specific abuse; it is sufficient to observe that the action of the state distorts the level playing field between competitors, thereby creating a disadvantage for other market players.

As part of the social dialogue specific to the VTC sector, the decision to approve an agreement makes it compulsory for all platforms and all workers included in its scope to comply with it, even if they were opposed to signing it or were not yet present on the market at the time it was signed. This would mean that all platforms would have to implement this system, even if they don’t have the necessary technology, except Uber.

In competition law, the term “anti-competitive foreclosure” describes a situation in which the behavior of the dominant undertaking impairs the maintenance of an effective competitive structure, thus allowing that undertaking to influence negatively, to its advantage and to the detriment of consumers, the various parameters of competition, such as prices, production, innovation, variety or quality of goods or services[15].

Collective agreements or imposed technological standards, while ostensibly aiming to regulate the market, may in fact lock access to the market by setting standards that only large technology companies like Uber can meet. Uber could also use its proprietary algorithms and vast amounts of data to make it impossible for new entrants to reach a critical size.

Consequently, Uber would then set prices, limit innovation, and reduce the variety or quality of services — to the detriment of consumers. This is precisely what the concept of anti-competitive foreclosure seeks to add.

Thus, in order to establish that an exclusionary practice is abusive, a competition authority must show “that practice was capable, when implemented, of producing such an exclusionary effect, in that it was capable of making it more difficult for competitors to enter or remain on the market in question and, by so doing, that that practice was capable of having an impact on the market structure; and, second, that practice relied on the use of means other than those which come within the scope of competition on the merits”[16].

While this case doesn’t directly apply to Uber, it highlights potential risks. The French competition authority raised concerns that the December 2023 agreement could create similar competitive distortions, particularly benefiting Uber, which already has the necessary technology. Uber’s predominant technological advantage, including its advanced algorithms, data infrastructure, and integrated driver interfaces, gives it a unique capacity to implement the required system for setting a minimum income per kilometer.

This technological lead could place competitors at a disadvantage, potentially leading to a form of technological foreclosure by limiting their ability to comply with the agreement under equal conditions. Although not a clear abuse of dominance, this issue was central to the authority’s analysis. The standardization of algorithms by other platforms granted by these agreements could be perceived as a restriction of competition by the effects.  

The French competition authority points out, however, that, in its view, there is no reason to affirm that the standardization of algorithms by other platforms, even with Uber’s tool, would necessarily lead to a standardization of practices. This may not lead to a pure alignment with the Uber device, which leaves the possibility for other platforms to retain some flexibility and differentiation.

Thus, this opinion allows the French competition authority to make several recommendations to the EPRA, while also addressing the future competitive prospects (III).

III. The opinion of the French competition authority: recommendations to the EPRA and prospects for competition

This section discusses the French competition authority’s opinion, focusing on its recommendations to the EPRA (A). It emphasizes the need for careful evaluation of the agreement’s impact on market dynamics, particularly for dominant platforms. Finally, The French competition authority issues a reserved opinion has reservations about the long-term viability of competition in this sector (B).

A. The Authority’s recommendations to the EPRA: a rigorous assessment of competitive risks

The French competition authority issues several recommendations to the ARPE. It stresses the importance of assessing, in advance, the competitive risks associated with such agreements.

The Authority calls for EPRA to be given the necessary means to identify these risks, to balance them with the social objectives pursued and to conduct comprehensive impact studies on the economic, social, financial, and technological effects of the agreements.

It also recommends that more frequent use be made of the expertise provided for in the Labor Code during negotiations, including at the initiative of EPRA itself, to ensure an objective assessment of impacts.

The Authority therefore calls on governments to be more vigilant and recommends that any approval of an agreement be based on a thorough analysis of its technical feasibility and its real social benefits for drivers. It is therefore crucial that the competent authorities continue to assess the competitive impacts through in-depth studies, considering the specific market dynamics of VTC platforms. Rigorous monitoring and ongoing analysis of the economic and social impacts of this agreement are essential to ensure fair competition and the preservation of innovation in this evolving sector.

A. A reserved opinion on the approval of the agreement of 19 December 2023

The Authority expresses reservations regarding the approval of the agreement dated December 19, 2023, which aims to strengthen VTC drivers’ freedom to choose their rides when using a ride-hailing platform. While acknowledging that the agreement itself does not, on its face, undermine free competition, the Authority questions the benefit for Uber already equipped to implement the new system and therefore holding a significant lead over competing platforms of extending this mechanism to the entire sector.

The Authority warns that such a sector-wide extension, originally designed to attract or retain VTC drivers, could potentially have anticompetitive effects. The existence or risk of harm to competition cannot be dismissed solely on the grounds of social objectives unless the achievement of those objectives is clearly made possible by the agreement itself.

Therefore, although the agreement is not illegal per se, it may represent risks for competition in the VTC market in the long term.

Angélina NICLIN

[1] Article L.7343-29 of the French Labor Code.

[2] Opinion 23-A-18 of November 29, 2023, on the Passenger Ground Transport Sector

[3] Special Eurobarometer 495 – Report – Mobility and Transport (pp. 34-46)

[4]  Commission notices on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law (97/C 372/03)

[5] Arno Rasek (German Competition Authority), Two-sided market, Global Dictionary of Competition Law, Concurrences, Art. N° 99954

[6] Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (the “TFEU”)

[7] Article L420-2 of the French Commercial Code

[8] Court of Justice of the European Communities, 21 September 1999, Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, Case C-67/96

[9] CJEU, 3 March 2011, AG2R Prévoyance v. Beaudout Père et Fils SARL, Case C-437/09, ECR p. I-973.

[10] Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons (2022/C 374/02), published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 30 September 2022.

[11] Ibid

[12] Court of Appeal of Paris, October 4, 2023, RG No. 21/22383, UberPop

[13] Responses to the surveys conducted by the French Competition Authority as part of its opinion of January 21, 2025, No. 25-A-03, regarding the downstream market of VTC and taxi platforms, T3P sector

[14]   Court of Justice of the European Union, 17 July 2014, DEI, case C-553/12 P

[15] European Commission, amending communication of 27 March 2023 on the Guidelines adopted by the Commission for the application of Article 102 TFEU to Abusive Exclusionary Practices by Dominant Undertakings

[16] Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgment of 12 May 2022, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale SpA and others v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato and others, Case C-377/20 (pt61)